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Cross Border Patent Disputes 
 
David A. Makman  
 
Because of the global nature of modern business, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to create appropriate and correct incentives in 
intellectual property cases. Despite the fact that there has been more than 
100 years of treaty negotiations regarding intellectual property issues, there 
is little international consensus as to the proper way to value patent cases. 
In any country, regardless of the specifics of the local intellectual 
property laws, the inventor who has a novel, non-obvious and useful idea 
that has significant commercial value is faced with three choices: they can 
disclose their invention in return for patent protection, they can try to protect 
it as a trade secret or they can develop a hybrid strategy using both forms of 
intellectual property protection. When the decision makers look at the steps 
they can take to protect their rights internationally, none of these forms of 
intellectual property protection is adequately effective. 
At least since the 1980s, intellectual property holders who are based in 
the United States have been able to rely on two aspects of the global economy 
to leverage their United States patent rights into worldwide licensing 
structures. First: the United States has a large economy that comprises a 
substantial percentage of the world economy. Second: the United States is 
relatively friendly to patent plaintiffs due to the availability of discovery and 
of high damages awards. That said, it has never been clear how long this 
patent-friendly environment would continue in the United States. A US 
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procedure are sufficiently unstable that one never knows how much the value 
of the patent will vary over the lifetime of the patent.1 
Nowadays, when one considers international markets, the benefits, 
costs and logistics associated with patent protection are even more 
complicated. The United States’ share of the global economy is diminishing 
which makes it more difficult to leverage one’s rights internationally given 
that each nation’s patents are limited to the territorial bounds of the nation 
that issued the patent, and many nations are not convinced of the value of 
strong patent rights. On paper, a United States patent provides an exclusive 
right, but in application, patented inventions often get used without 
authorization all over the world and, nowadays, injunctions are not common 
in the United States. A recent Supreme Court case, WesternGeco LLC v. Ion 
Geophysical Corp., 16-1011 U.S. , 201 L.Ed. 584 (2018), revives the 
principle that a patentee who prevails on a claim of patent infringement 
should be put in the same position that she would be in but for the 
infringement, and awards damages for infringement based on revenues that 
were realized outside the United States. Although the results in that decision 
don’t seem demonstrably wrong, the way that it was written seems 
inconsistent with the history of extraterritorial application of U.S. law and 
the broad language used in the decision has, at least for the short term, 
injected a good deal of uncertainty into cross border patent disputes. 
 
History of Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law 
The principle that the United States patent laws are limited to the 
bounds of the United States was firmly established in the Supreme Court 
case of Brown v. Duchesne, 60 US 183 (1856). That case involved a patented 
invention that was in use on a foreign ship. The question was whether there 
was patent infringement when the foreign ship entered a U.S. port and the 
invention was used to help with the “construction, fitting out, or equipment” 
of the vessel. 
In its ruling, Court established the principle that U.S. Patent laws (in 
fact, US laws in general) do not have extraterritorial application, as follows: 
The patent laws are authorized by that article in the Constitution which 
provides that Congress shall have power to promote the progress of 
 
1. For example, 20 years ago in the United States, there was a presumption of irreparable 
harm that occurred on a finding of patent infringement, and injunctions issued in patent cases as a 
matter of course. Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
That changed with the when the Supreme Court handed down its eBay decision, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), making injunctive relief much harder to obtain. 
In this author’s view, it is unlikely that anyone filing a patent application in 1998 would have 
predicted that injunctive relief would become unavailable during the life of the applied-for patent. 
This is just one example of the unpredictable nature of the patent system. 
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science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries. The power thus granted is domestic in its character, and 
necessarily confined within the limits of the United States. It confers 
no power on Congress to regulate commerce or the vehicles of 
commerce, which belong to a foreign nation and occasionally visit our 
ports in their commercial pursuits. That power and the treatymaking 
power of the general government are separate and distinct powers 
from the one of which we are now speaking, and are granted by 
separate and different clauses, and are in no degree connected with it. 
And when Congress are legislating to protect authors and inventors, 
their attention is necessarily attracted to the authority under which 
they are acting, and it ought not lightly to be presumed that they 
intended to go beyond it and exercise another and distinct power 
conferred on them for a different purpose. 
Nor is there anything in the patent laws that should lead to a different 
conclusion. They are all manifestly intended to carry into execution this 
particular power. They secure to the inventor a just remuneration from those 
who derive a profit or advantage within the United States from his genius 
and mental labors. 
But the right of property which a patentee has in his invention, and his 
right to its exclusive use, are derived altogether from these statutory 
provisions, and this Court has always held that an inventor has no right of 
property in his invention upon which he can maintain a suit unless he obtains 
a patent for it according to the acts of Congress, and that his rights are to be 
regulated and measured by these laws, and cannot go beyond them. 
But these acts of Congress do not and were not intended to operate 
beyond the limits of the United States, and as the patentee’s right of property 
and exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits 
to which the law itself is confined. And the use of it outside of the 
jurisdiction of the United States is not an infringement of his rights, and he 
has no claim to any compensation for the profit or advantage the party may 
derive from it. 
Brown 60 US 183 at 195-6. 
This a clear and well-articulated statement of the reasons that the laws 
of Congress are limited to the United States and, absent clear legislative 
intent to regulate conduct that takes place outside the United States, have 
extra-territorial application only pursuant to treaty. Over the years, however, 
as the economy has become more global, this principle has eroded in patent 
law as the world economy became more globalized. 
The modern era of extraterritorial application of U.S. Patent law 
arguably began in the 1970s with the case of Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
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Laitram Corp, 406 U.S. 518 (1972)—a controversial decision which made it 
clear that the way that the traditional rule that limits the scope of the patent 
laws to the bounds of the United States might not be fair in the modern global 
economy. In that case, the defendant was manufacturing all of the 
components of a patented shrimp de-veining mechanism and then shipping 
the components, unassembled, overseas for assembly and use. Since the 
claimed device was not made, used or sold in the United States there was no 
direct infringement.2 
The Deepsouth Packing Co. was sufficiently objectionable that 
Congress responded by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and § 271(g) in 1984, 
thereby creating a statutory basis for a form of extra-territorial application of 
United States patent laws. Section 271(f) relates to creating components of 
patented inventions within the United States and then exporting them for use 
outside the United States, which is the situation that was at issue in 
Deepsouth Packing Co. In contrast, Section 271(g) relates to using patented 
methods outside the United States and then trying to export the resultant un- 
patented products to the United States. For either statute, the patent 
inventions are not made or used within the United States, and, therefore, the 
conduct that one would normally think of as patent infringement occurs 
outside the United States. However, both statutes are drafted to regulate 
conduct that actually does occur within the United States. 
Subsequently, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the direct 
infringement statute, to make the “offer for sale” of a patented invention an 
infringement and to make “importing” into the United States an 
infringement. Both of these changes further extended the reach of U.S. 
Patent law. Indeed, with the advent of the Internet, it became quite common 
for people outside the United States to sell products directly to customers 
located in the United States. When they do this, they run the risk of being 
held to have made an “offer for sale” within the United States and, thereby, 
infringed on the rights of a patent holder. They also run the risk of a US 








2. Without direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), there can be no indirect 
infringement. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. , 377 U.S. 476, 482-3 (holding 
that direct infringement is required as an element of contributory infringement); DSU Med. Corp. 
v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (holding that the patentee always has the burden of proving direct 
infringement in order to prove active inducement of infringement). 
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The Federal Circuit and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit has traditionally taken a careful approach to avoid 
expanding the extra-territorial reach of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). For example, the 
Court ruled that it was not necessary to prove that the components supplied 
by the defendant are actually assembled into an infringing product overseas 
in order to prevail on a Section 271(f)(1) claim. Waymar Corp. v. Porta Sys. 
Corp., 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The logic was that the statute does 
not require the combination of components to actually occur because all of 
the elements of the statutory claim are met when the defendant ships the 
components from the United States with the intent that they be combined in 
an infringing manner outside the United States. By interpreting the statute 
this way, the Federal Circuit effectively ensured that all of the actions that 
constitute infringement are completed within the United States. In other 
words, there is no genuine application of extraterritoriality when the statute 
is interpreted in this manner because the patentee does not have to submit 
any proof regarding what actually happens with the products overseas. 
In addition, the Federal Circuit has generally declined to expand Section 
271(f) beyond articles of manufacture. Thus, for example, in Pellegrini v. 
Analog Devices, Inc. 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the defendant designed 
a product in the United States but the actual manufacture and sale took place 
overseas. The Court found no infringement under Section 271(f) because 
the statute did not reach to design and oversight activities that took place in 
the United States given that there were no manufactured products supplied 
from the United States. Id. 
Similarly, in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the Court ruled that a 
drug that was developed overseas, even if it was developed using information 
that was obtained through use of the patented method overseas, did not 
infringe because the statute is limited to items of manufacture, and did not 
reach the drug that was created using information that was obtained through 
use of the patented method overseas. Bayer A.G. v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 
340 F.33d 1367 (Fed Cir. 2003). 
Both the Bayer case and the Pellegrini case are interesting from the 
point of view of the incentives provided to the inventor in return for 
disclosing their invention to the public. If we assume for the purposes of 
argument that the patents in those cases were valid and infringed, the cases 
involve situations where the alleged infringer was permitted to profit from 
the use of the patented technology without rewarding the patentee despite 
the fact that the defendants had some conduct that took place within the 
United States. That said, the great bulk of infringing activity, if any, 
occurred overseas, and the patentee could have obtained protection overseas 
and could have pursued infringement claims in the appropriate foreign 
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jurisdiction. The trouble for many inventors, is that they often can’t afford 
to obtain protection overseas. In addition, the difficulty of pursuing 
infringement claims overseas is often so high that inventors have to forego 
protection outside the United States. Arguably, this creates opportunities for 
sophisticated infringers to profit in markets outside the United States. 
 
The Microsoft Case 
The Supreme Court took the opportunity to weigh in on the subject of 
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent damages in the Microsoft case, which 
was one of a series of cases that arose due to Microsoft’s practice of writing 
the source code to its software in the United States and then shipping a “gold 
disk” containing the source code to Ireland where the code would be 
compiled after which the resultant executable software would be loaded onto 
the computers that were thereafter sold throughout Europe. See, Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). The claim in the patent at issue 
was directed to a computer that was programmed to perform a specific task, 
and the Court ruled that the disk that was supplied from the United States 
was not a “component” of the invention. Id. 
Microsoft is based in the United States in the sense that, among other 
things, Microsoft does its software development in the United States and 
employs development engineers in the United States. However, the 
Company sells the resultant software all over the world. Along with the 
Pellegrini case and the other cases discussed above, this Microsoft decision 
limits the damages in United States patent cases in such a way that foreign 
sales are generally not part of the revenue base that is considered in making 
reasonable royalty determinations in United States. The case effectively 
creates a rule of thumb that, for each country where an inventor wants to be 
rewarded for disclosing their invention, the inventor must seek a patent in 
that country. This makes building a global patent portfolio quite expensive 
because one must obtain and maintain patents all over the world in systems 
that have different languages and are neither easily predictable nor well 
harmonized. 
Yet, despite the expense, the rule that damages are calculated separately 
for each country and must be pursued separately in each country makes good 
sense from the perspective of international comity. If the Court in Microsoft, 
had ruled the foreign sales could be counted as an infringement based on the 
fact that the code is written in the United States, Microsoft would have had 
a significant incentive to move its development out of the United States in 
order to avoid putting its worldwide sales at risk in patent infringement cases. 
Moreover, U.S. multinationals would, presumably, not feel comfortable with 
a reciprocal rule that permits foreign courts to order damages based on US 
Sales regardless of whether or not the patentee has a United States patent. 
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The WesternGeco Decision 
In this context, the Supreme Court’s decision in WesternGeco LLC v. 
Ion Geophysical Corp., supra, was surprising. The case involved an off- 
shore drilling project. There were two bidders for the project—the patentee 
and the infringer. Western Geco, L.Ed 201 L.Ed. at 590-1. The patented 
system uses lateral-steering technology to produce higher quality data than 
previous survey systems and WesternGeco did not sell or license its 
technology but, instead, used its technology to perform surveys for oil and 
gas companies. Id. The defendant manufactured components for its 
infringing system in the United States and then sold them to companies 
abroad. Id. 
In analyzing the case, the Court first noted the rebuttable presumption 
that federal statutes only apply within the United States. Id. at 591. The 
Court then analyzed the statute and concluded that Section 271(f) applies to 
the domestic conduct of supplying components from the United States, 
which the defendant did. Id. at 591-594. Having ruled that supplying 
components from the United States, the Court ruled that foreign lost profits 
are available when the patentee proves infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 
271(f). Id. at 594. 
Lost profits are available in patent cases when the Plaintiff can prove 
that it would have made all of the sales made by the Defendant but for the 
Defendant’s patent infringement. Such damages are only available if 
Plaintiff can meet the four Panduit factors, i.e., can prove that (1) there was 
a demand for the patented product, (2) that there was an absence of 
acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) that Plaintiff had the 
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the 
amount of profit the patent owner would have made. Panduit Courp. V. 
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). This 
lost profits damages test is a “but for” test, which awards damages if the 
Plaintiff proves that defendants profits would not have been made “but for” 
the patent infringement. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling, based on General Motors Corp. v. Devex 
Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983), was that lost profit patent damages were to 
place the patent owner “in as good a position as [it] would have been in had 
the infringer” not infringed. 201 L.Ed. at 593. And, in WesternGeco, there 
was infringement in the United States—the infringing components were 
supplied from the United States in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). If the 
infringement occurred due to supply of the components from the United 
States, most defendants would argue that the damages should be based on 
the price charged and profits made for the sale of those components. 
However, neither the patentee nor the defendant sold the products that 
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embodied the claimed invention. Rather, they both charged for services 
which required their use, and those services took place outside the United 
States. Defendant could credibly argue that no profits were lost within the 
United States. And, Plaintiff could credibly argue that “but for” the 
infringement, Plaintiff would have won all of the surveying contracts at issue 
in the lawsuit and made all of the profits made from the conduct that took 
place outside the United States. 
There was a dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch who was joined by 
Justice Breyer. They were of the opinion that damages would have to be 
limited to the conduct that occurs within the United States, i.e., to the supply 
of components from the United States. Their reasoning is that the use of the 
patented invention took place outside the United States and, therefore, was 
not “infringement” and therefore not a basis for a damages award. Western 
Geco at 595-596. Their reasoning was that: 
Section 271(f)(2) modifies the circumstances when the law will treat an 
invention as having been made within the United States. It permits an 
infringement claim—and the damages that come with it—not only when 
someone produces the complete invention in this country for export, but also 
when someone exports key components of the invention for assembly 
aboard. A person who ships components from the United States intending 
they be assembled across the border is “liable” to the patent owner for 
royalties and lost profits the same as if he made the entire invention here. 
§271(f)(2). 
Id. at 596. However, they did not consider the actual use of the patented 
invention outside the United States to be appropriate for a damages analysis. 
Id. at 600 (“By failing to heed the plain text of the Patent Act and the lessons 
of our precedents, the Court ends up assuming that patent damages run 
(literally) to the ends of the earth. It allows U.S. patent owners to extend their 
patent monopolies far beyond anything Congress has authorized and shields 
them from foreign competition U.S. patents were never meant to reach.”). 
 
The Uncertain Future 
It is not clear how broadly the WesternGeco decision will be interpreted 
in the future. One could perhaps distinguish the case by arguing, for 
example, that the infringing conduct in the case may have taken place in 
international waters where there is no authority that provides patents and 
that, therefore, the patentee would get little or no relief absent the lost profits 
awards. However, while this may be true, the Court’s decision does not 
particularly support such an argument. 
One might also argue that it is a rare patent Plaintiff that will be able to 
meet the lost profits test for sales outside the United States. The Plaintiff 
would have to obtain discovery about the extraterritorial sales and prove the 
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sales and manufacturing capacity to make all of those sales and that it would 
have made all of those sales but for the infringing conduct in the United 
States. See Panduit, supra. That said, one can anticipate that Plaintiffs will 
argue, based on this decision, that foreign sales should be considered when 
deciding reasonable royalty awards if there are foreign sales that can be 
connected to infringement in the United States. Broadly read, the Supreme 
Court decision has opened up arguments relating to damages based on the 
consequences of patent infringement. 
 
Case Law Subsequent to WesternGeco 
As of the time of writing this article, there have only been a few patent 
decisions that cite to WesternGeco. In Seoul Viosys Co. v. P3 Int’l Corp., 
2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 169651 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30 2018), the Court cited 
WesternGeco in the context of a “safe harbor claim” for the proposition that 
one should not “conflate legal injury with the damages arising from that 
injury”, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant’s affirmative 
defense that no remedy was available for alleged infringement of its patent. 
The “safe harbor” claim was that, because defendant acquired its inventories 
before it learned of the product, they could not be held liable under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b) for importing the allegedly infringing products. 
In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171699, the Court considered the question of whether or 
not worldwide sales should be considered in evaluating patent damages for 
infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The Court held that the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor 
Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (2013) had been overruled by the WesternGeco 
decision. However, recognizing that it was not necessarily the place of a 
district court to tell an appellate court that it had been over-ruled, the Court 
certified the question of whether or not the decision had been over-ruled for 
interlocutory appeal, while also ruling that worldwide sales would be 
considered at trial, thereby allowing the case to move forward. 
In MLC Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 199769, the Court held that the case law regarding the relevance of 
worldwide sales information to damages analysis was “unclear” in light of 
the WesternGeco decision, but nevertheless allowed the Plaintiff to get 
discovery of those sales. 
In Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 
1070, the Court noted that to recover damages for overseas conduct, the 
patent plaintiff would have to prove a causal relationship between foreign 
sales and infringement in the United States, but found that there was no 
prejudice to the defendant because there was no evidence that the jury took 
foreign sales into account in awarding damages. 




The WesternGeco decision is an excellent example of the difficulties in 
setting incentives for patentees in a global environment. On the one hand, 
the Plaintiff was able to prove that it would have made profits but for the 
Defendant’s infringement, and on the other hand, those profits would have 
been gained outside the boundaries of the United States. The Court chose to 
give remedy to the patentee over strict appliance of the rules of territoriality. 
The ramifications of this decision are already being felt in the lower courts, 
and it will be interesting to see how the law develops in the future. 
